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Proportionality and invariable baseline intensity of review* 
 
Cora Chan** 
 
One of the most contested issues in UK public law is how to calibrate the appropriate 
intensity of proportionality review in human rights adjudication. Here the challenge lies in 
formulating a theory of intensity of review that can both comply with the constitutional 
framework introduced by the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’) and accommodate courts’ 
varying levels of competence in different areas of litigation. This article attempts to sketch 
such a theory in two steps. First, it argues that to fulfil the constitutional expectations 
brought about by the HRA, a minimum rigour of proportionality review should be observed. 
This baseline consists of requiring the government to demonstrate to the courts by means of 
cogent and sufficient evidence that a rights-limiting measure satisfies the distinct stages of 
the proportionality test. Secondly, this article highlights the ways in which compliance with 
this baseline can nonetheless accommodate the courts’ varying levels of competence in 
different adjudicative contexts. In particular, courts can vary the intensity of review once the 
baseline level of review is reached and adjust the nature of the evidence required from the 
government.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of proportionality as a standard of review in cases concerning the Human Rights Act 
1998 (‘HRA’) has brought about both promises and anxieties. On the one hand, 
proportionality is expected to become the definitive framework for protecting human rights, 
offering more intense scrutiny of government decisions as compared to traditional standards 
of review. Yet on the other, there are concerns that such an inherently intrusive standard will 
enable courts to interfere with questions that they lack the institutional capacity or democratic 
legitimacy to decide. To allay these concerns, courts and academics have heralded that courts 
can apply proportionality with varying degrees of intensity or deference, exercising the level 
of control appropriate to the circumstances.
1
 Proportionality has been presented as if it is a 
magic wand that can shrink or expand flexibly at the court’s will. 
                                                 
*The wording of the title is adapted from the title of Julian Rivers’ influential article, ‘Proportionality and 
variable intensity of review’ in (2006) 65 CLJ 174. 
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The search for a formal theory of intensity of review for applying the substantive theory 
of proportionality has hitherto focused on what factors should influence the strength of 
review in human rights cases.
2
 An overlooked issue is the extent to which the intensity of 
proportionality review may vary; in particular, whether proportionality should be applied 
‘infinitely cautiously’ where potential infringements of human rights are at stake.3 This is an 
important issue. If courts apply proportionality with scant rigour, there will be insufficient 
protection against human rights violations. The prevalent view on whether there is a limit to 
the flexibility of proportionality in rights review seems to be that such review can be 
extremely lax. In the name of deference, courts have allowed limitations of rights that are 
‘not manifestly disproportionate’4 or have been terse in scrutinising the government’s case on 
proportionality.
5
 Some commentators have implied that rights review can be light-touch by 
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David Feldman, Lusina Ho, Tony Carty, Peter Chau, Mingchiu Li, Ernest Lim, Eileen Lou, Javier Oliva, Scott 
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1
 Below notes 2 and 7; P Craig, Administrative Law 6
th
 Edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), pp 635-636; 
M Elliott, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review’ (2001) 60 CLJ 301, at 313-
315; M Elliott, ‘The HRA 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review’ [2002] 7 JR 97, at 99; M Taggart, 
‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ (2008) NZLR 423, 465; Mahmood v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] 1 WLR 840 (‘Mahmood’), at [19]; Farrakhan v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] EWCA Civ 606 (‘Farrakhan’), at [64]. 
2
 Eg M Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Public Law Needs “Due Deference” in N Bamforth and P Leyland 
(eds) Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 337 and J Jowell, ‘Judicial 
Deference and Human Rights: a Question of Competence’ in P Craig and R Rawlings (eds), Law and 
Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p 67. The distinction 
between substantive and formal theories of proportionality was drawn in J Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable 
intensity of review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 174 at 177; R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by J 
Rivers) (Oxford: OUP, 2002), pp 414-425. For other theories of deference, see A Kavanagh, Constitutional 
Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) (‘Constitutional Review’), part II; A 
Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126 LQR 222; AL Young, 
‘In Defence of Due Deference’ (2009) 72(4) MLR 554; RA Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human 
Rights Act’ (2002) 65(6) MLR 859. Perhaps the sole dissent to the search for a theory of deference is TRS 
Allan, see his ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “Due Deference”’ (2006) 65 CLJ 671; and 
‘Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory’ (2011) 127 LQR 96. 
3
 T Poole, ‘The reformation of English administrative law’ (2009) 68 CLJ 142, at 147. 
4
 Eg S and KF v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 1810 (Admin) (‘S and KF’) at [44]-[48]; Aguilar 
Quila v Secretary of State for Home Department; Bibi v Same [2011] UKSC 45 (‘Quila’) at [91] per Lord 
Brown (dissenting judge); British Telecommunications Plc v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) (‘British Telecommunications’), at [234]; Sheffield City Council v Personal 
Representatives of June Wall [2010] EWCA Civ 922, at [33]; Sinclair Collis Limited v Secretary of State for 
Health [2010] EWHC 3112 (‘Sinclair’), at [94]-[96]; Global Knafaim Leasing Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority 
[2010] EWHC 1348 (Admin) (‘Global Knafaim’) at [65]; SRM Global Master Fund LP [2009] EWCA Civ 788 
at [75]; Federation of Tour Operators v HM Treasury [2008] EWCA Civ 752, at [21]; Cadogan v Pitts [2008] 
UKHL 71, at [48]; Trailer & Marina (Leven) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs [2004] EWHC 153 (‘Trailer & Marina’) at pp 847-848; Ford v Press Complaints Commission [2001] 
EWHC Admin 683 at [28]. 
5
 Eg Ghai v Newcastle City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 59 (‘Ghai’), at [121]-[123]; Animal Defenders 
International v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15 (‘Animal Defenders’) at [31]-
[37]; R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] 2 AC 307 (‘Gillan’) esp at [62]-[65]; International 
Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 (‘Roth’), at [75]-[87], per 
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endorsing these judgments.
6
 Contrarily, a few authors have hinted that proportionality review 
cannot be very relaxed in human rights cases.
7
 Nevertheless, there has been little systematic 
analysis on what a baseline intensity of review may look like. 
This article aims to debunk the widely shared misconception (at least among the 
judiciary) that proportionality can be applied with any intensity in human rights cases. While 
it may be true that proportionality, discussed as a general head of review for different subject 
matters, may be applied with a wide range of rigour,
8
 the intensity of proportionality review 
in rights cases in the U.K. should be determined within the constitutional framework set by 
the HRA. The challenge, then, is to formulate a theory of intensity of review that not only 
accommodates the courts’ varying levels of institutional capacity and legitimacy in different 
contexts but also satisfies constitutional principles under the HRA. This article will attempt to 
sketch such a theory in two steps. First, it will argue that to comply with the rules of 
adjudication under the HRA, courts must observe a minimum intensity of proportionality 
review. It will show that courts have so far failed to observe this threshold, sometimes due to 
an indiscriminate import of the proportionality formulae of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’). 
Secondly, this article will propose how compliance with this baseline can nonetheless 
accommodate courts’ varying levels of competence in different adjudicative contexts. In 
particular, once the minimum level of review is reached, courts can vary the intensity of 
review in accordance with the severity of the rights limitation, which is a function of the 
importance and nature of the right and the degree of limitation.
9
 Moreover, courts can adjust 
the nature of the evidence required from the government in different cases. It is hoped that by 
defining an invariable baseline intensity of review in rights cases and clarifying the ways in 
which proportionality review is variable, this article can contribute to resolving the apparent 
dilemma between protecting individual rights on the one hand and respecting majoritarian 
                                                                                                                                                        
Laws LJ (dissenting judge); Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40 (‘Wilson’), at 
[70]-[78]; Farrakhan at [71]-[79]. 
6
 See eg section 3 below, evaluating the theories of Rivers and Kavanagh.  
7
 M Elliott, ‘Scrutiny of Executive Decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998: Exactly How “Anxious”?’ 
[2001] 6 JR 166 at paras 13-15; Elliott, above n 1, JR at 99; CLJ at 311; R Clayton, ‘Proportionality and the 
HRA 1998: Implications for Substantive Review’ [2002] 7 JR 124, at para 44; G Phillipson, ‘Deference, 
Discretion and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era’, (2007) 60 CLP 40, at 76; D Feldman, ‘Proportionality 
and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in E Ellis (ed) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp 122-124; M Fordham and T de la Mare, ‘Identifying the principles of 
proportionality’ in J Jowell and J Cooper (eds), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002), p 60. 
8
 Eg In the EU, where proportionality is an independent head of review, it may justifiably be argued that 
proportionality review can range from ‘not manifestly disproportionate’ (eg where the Common Agricultural 
Policy is concerned) to strict necessity (eg where fundamental freedoms are restricted). Ellis, ibid. 
9
 Cf Rivers, above n 2 at 205. 
4 
 
democracy and the government’s institutional competence on the other – a dilemma which 
the express reception of proportionality in human rights adjudication has exacerbated. 
This article will proceed on two fairly uncontroversial assumptions. First, it is generally 
accepted in academia that UK courts are not bound to follow the ECtHR’s proportionality 
analysis in assessing whether a rights interference is justified, where such analysis has been 
diluted by the margin of appreciation.
10
 It is widely accepted that courts are free in these 
instances to apply proportionality in a way that accords more protection to rights than that 
offered by Strasbourg.
11
 As has been explored elsewhere, this position is supported by 
parliamentary intent.
12
 This position is also intellectually appealing because the concerns of 
cultural distance that underlie the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation concept has no application 
in domestic courts.
13
 This article seeks to devise a formal theory of proportionality using the 
adjudicative rules introduced by the HRA as an analytical framework. It is hoped that this 
will contribute to the construction of a home-grown theory of proportionality, which can fill 
the void that the ‘disentangling’ of the margin of appreciation aspects from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence would inevitably leave.
14
 
Secondly, this article assumes that it is important to fulfil the constitutional expectations 
that the HRA has created. As will be seen, these expectations grew from a recognition of 
Convention rights as fundamental requirements of our democracy. Unless and until courts are 
                                                 
10
 Whether domestic courts should incorporate the margin of appreciation when defining the scope of a right is 
more controversial, but is not relevant for present purposes. See Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
[2004] UKHL 39 at [27]. 
11
 Judicial attitudes are more diverse. Contrast, eg ProLife Alliance v British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] 2 
All ER 756 at [33]-[34] with Ullah v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 at [20], Ambrose v Harris [2011] 
UKSC 43, and S and KF at [50]-[71]. Cf. H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human 
Rights Act (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp 105-106, 144-153; G Phillipson, H Fenwick, ‘Public protest, the Human 
Rights Act and judicial responses to political expression’ (2000) PL 627, at 641-645; Feldman, above n 7, pp 
120-125; Fordham and de la Mare, above n 7, p 82; I Leigh, ‘Taking rights proportionately: judicial review, the 
Human Rights Act and Strasbourg’ [2002] PL 265, at 272- 277; Sir John Laws ‘The limitations of human rights’ 
(1998) PL 254 at 258; R Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ (2004) PL 725; R Masterman, ‘Aspiration of foundation? The status of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and the “Convention rights” in domestic law’ in H Fenwick, G Phillipson and R Masterman (eds), 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), p 57; M Hunt, R Singh and M 
Demetriou, ‘Is there a role for the “margin of appreciation” in national law after the Human Rights Act?’ (1999) 
1 EHRLR 15.  
12
 See commentaries ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 This article will only sketch the basic structure of such a theory. Ideally, the theory should incorporate the 
central ideas of the Convention and principles specific to each right as well. Cf R Masterman, ‘Taking the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a “municipal law of human rights” under the Human Rights 
Act’ (2005) ICLQ 907; Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 11, p 146. The need for a domestic theory of 
proportionality will be more compelling if plans to widen the margin of appreciation in Strasbourg are 
implemented: eg Brighton Declaration, High Level Conference on the European Court of Human Rights. My 
arguments will not be affected by attempts to introduce a UK Bill of Rights, unless the Bill significantly reduces 
domestic courts’ powers, which is unlikely.    
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prepared to forsake this view of rights – my analysis below will show that they clearly are not 
ready to do so – judicial candour and consistency call for them to faithfully fulfil these 
expectations. 
This article focuses on the rigour with which proportionality should be applied in testing 
the justifiability of a measure after a prima facie limitation of rights has been established. I 
am non-committal on whether my arguments apply to the use of proportionality in other 
contexts.
15
 ‘Government’ will be used in this article to refer to the legislature or executive. In 
the following, I will first distinguish two senses of the ‘intensity of review’. Next I will 
underline three expectations that the HRA has created. I will then argue that to realise these 
expectations, a minimum intensity of review must be observed. This article will conclude by 
explaining how compliance with this baseline can remain responsive to context. 
 
1. TWO SENSES OF ‘INTENSITY OF REVIEW’ 
 
In referring to the ‘intensity of review’, courts and academics oscillate between two senses of 
the term.
16
 In a broad sense, the intensity of review denotes the extent to which the court 
scrutinises the government’s decisions. Judges and academics are using the term in this sense 
when they describe proportionality as a standard that inherently allows for more ‘intense’ 
review than Wednesbury unreasonableness.
17
 The intensity of review in this sense is 
controlled by (1) the standard of review (e.g. Wednesbury or proportionality) and (2) the 
rigour or intensity with which such standard is applied, or intensity of review in a narrow 
sense. The intensity of review in both senses is variable and consists of a spectrum. 
This article is interested in the narrow sense of the term, specifically, the rigour with 
which the standard of review in human rights adjudication – namely, proportionality – should 
be applied. Nonetheless, as the next section illustrates, how rigorous proportionality analysis 
in rights cases should be is affected by how intrusive the judiciary ought to be in the broad 
sense in that context. Unless otherwise stated, ‘intensity of review’ will be used in this article 
to denote the narrow sense of the term. Courts have controlled the intensity of proportionality 
review mainly through manipulating the following elements:
18
 
                                                 
15
 For example, to test whether a right has been interfered with. 
16
 It is sometimes unclear in which sense the term is being used. Eg Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, 204, 259. 
I thank Julian Rivers for stressing the importance of highlighting the distinction between the two usages of the 
term. 
17
 Below n 20. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
18
 Elliott proposes that courts can exhibit deference in two ways: (1) phrasing the proportionality questions in a 
less demanding way, or (2) making it easier for the government to satisfy them that the questions have been 
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(a) Components of the standard of review: e.g. whether proportionality consists only of a 
single fair balance question or of an elaborate template of questions. 
(b) Burden of proof: whether it is for the government to prove that a rights limitation is 
proportionate, or for the litigant to prove that it is not. 
(c) Standard of proof: how certain the court should be that a rights-limiting measure is 
proportionate before sanctioning the measure e.g. beyond reasonable doubt (the 
criminal standard) or on a balance of probabilities (the civil standard). 
(d) Quantum and quality of evidence required to discharge the burden of proof: whether 
the party bearing the burden of justifying rights limitations must adduce cogent and 
sufficient evidence to do so, or may rely on assertions or presumptions that are not 
fully demonstrated by evidence. 
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL EXPECTATIONS UNDER THE HRA 
 
The HRA has created new constitutional expectations regarding the rules of human rights 
adjudication. I will highlight three of them, drawn from judgments and academic writing on 
the subject. 
First, it is expected that if there is a spectrum of intensity of review (in the broad sense), 
then human rights review should categorically fall on the most intense section of this 
spectrum, and such searching scrutiny is to be delivered through applying proportionality 
intensely (in the narrow sense).  
Even before the inception of the HRA, courts have emphasised that common law rights 
attract the most anxious scrutiny on the sliding scale of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
19
 In 
Daly – the leading authority on the standard of review in human rights cases – the House of 
Lords confirmed proportionality as the standard of review and distinguished it from 
traditional standards of review such as Wednesbury unreasonableness and anxious 
Wednesbury scrutiny, which it considered as insufficient for protecting rights.
20
 Daly 
conceives proportionality as a more intrusive and structured test. The intrusiveness is 
                                                                                                                                                        
answered satisfactorily. In my view, (a) corresponds to (1), whereas (c) and (d) correspond to (2). M Elliott, 
‘Proportionality and Deference: the Importance of a Structured Approach’ in C Forsyth, M Elliott, S Jhaveri, A 
Scully-Hill, and M Ramsden (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010), p 269. 
19
 Eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department Ex p. Leech [1994] QB 198. 
20
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Daly [2001] 2 AC 532 (‘Daly’), per Lord Steyn at [27]-
[28]. This was handed down after the ECtHR’s judgment of Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493, 
which confirmed that traditional standards of review are insufficient for protecting Convention rights. 
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guaranteed by courts ‘themselves’ deciding the ‘twin’ questions of whether the interference is 
necessary and proportionate. This penetrating inquiry is translated into a set of questions that 
infuses the test with structure. Daly endorsed the 3-stage De Freites formula:  
1. Whether the measure pursues a sufficiently important aim;  
2. Whether the measure is rationally connected to the aim;  
3. Whether the measure is no more than necessary to achieve the aim. This stage 
requires courts to consider whether there are alternatives that can achieve the aim to 
the same degree but encroach the right to a smaller extent.  
Subsequent decisions expanded the notion of fair balance into a 4
th
 limb:  
4. Whether the benefits of the measure are overall worth the costs.21  
Courts have frequently endorsed Daly’s approach to rights review22 and emphasised that 
human rights adjudication must be structured and stringent.
23
 Many academics who argue 
that the strength of proportionality enquiry should vary across subject matters accept that 
rights invite the rigorous end of the scale.
24
 Craig, for instance, contends that fundamental 
rights attract a searching proportionality analysis involving consideration of alternatives.
25
 
Likewise, Elliott argues that proportionality should be given ‘full weight’ in rights cases, 
which ‘will always involve “anxious scrutiny”’, although ‘the precise degree of anxiety… 
will vary [with context]’.26 The expectation has all along been that a rigorous and structured 
proportionality test should apply, to enable a high degree of scrutiny in human rights cases.  
The second expectation is that once a prima facie limitation of rights has been 
established, the government bears the burden of justifying it.
27
 Traditionally, the litigant bears 
the burden of showing that public conduct fails the requisite standard. Scholars describe the 
shift in onus in rights cases as signifying a shift in culture: from one of authority to one of 
                                                 
21
 Eg Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 (‘Huang’), at [19]; recent 
application in Regina (F (A Child)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 331, at [17]. 
22
 Eg Begum v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15 (‘Begum’), p 116 ; Farrakhan at [65]; Huang 
at [13]; ProLife Alliance v British Broadcasting Corporation [2004] 1AC 185 (‘ProLife’) at [133]; Sinclair, at 
[68]; R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247 (‘Shayler’) at [33]-[79]; Ponting v Governor of Whitemoor Prison [2002] 
EWCA Civ 224, at [64]-[71], [108]-[109]; Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Secretary [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1139 (‘Samaroo’), at [15]-[17]; Roth at [51]-[52], [181], [193].  
23
 Eg Naik v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1546 (‘Naik’) at [88]; Ahmed v Her 
Majesty’s Treasury [2010] 2 AC 534, at 591-593; Begum; Mahmood at [16]-[19], [39]; A v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (‘Belmarsh’) at [44]; ProLife at [12]; R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department es p. Turgut [2001] 1 All ER 719 at 729; South Bucks District Council v Porter [2003] 3 All 
ER 1 (‘Porter’) at [58]. 
24
 Below notes 25-26; Taggart, above n 1 at 477-478; Clayton, above n 7 at para 44.  
25
 Craig, above n 1, pp 628-629. 
26
 Emphasis added. Elliott, above n 1 JR at 99; CLJ at 311, 336. 
27
 Recently confirmed in Quila at [44]; AB (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2008] 1 WLR 
1893 at [7]. See also Taggart, above n 1 at 439; Fordham and de la Mare, above n 7, pp 27, 88. 
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justification.
28
 Under the latter, courts are no longer expected to give the government the 
benefit of the doubt or to take it on blind trust.  
The third expectation is that courts are now guardians of rights. The case law and 
scholarship is replete with acknowledgements of this constitutional role.
29
 The HRA is an 
express democratic mandate for courts to police the compatibility of legislative and executive 
acts with individual rights.
30
 Courts are given new powers of interpretation, reviewing 
legislation and issuing declarations of incompatibility. There is no doubt that under the HRA 
courts are empowered to pronounce the contours of a rights-based democracy, 
notwithstanding Parliament’s ultimate power to defy these pronouncements.31 
All three expectations are premised on the normative significance of human rights. A 
rigorous and structured proportionality test is necessary and desirable for protecting these 
rights. Feldman suggests that in order to give ‘central importance’ to Convention rights, the 
proportionality enquiry should ask whether the measure is ‘sufficiently narrowly drawn and 
accurately aimed’ at its purpose and whether the measure is overall balanced.32 Craig 
contends that consideration of alternatives is necessary since the ‘very denomination of an 
interest as a fundamental right means that any invasion… should be kept to a minimum’.33 
Moreover, allocating the burden of justification to the government reflects the importance of 
rights in situations where the case for and against finding a rights violation is equally strong 
or it is uncertain which side is stronger.
34
 Finally, vesting the power to protect rights with an 
independent and impartial branch of the government is necessary to give practical effect to 
rights.
35
 It is therefore natural that the enactment of the HRA – the express Parliamentary 
recognition of Convention rights as requirements of British democracy – has created 
expectations of these rules. 
 
3. BASELINE INTENSITY OF REVIEW 
                                                 
28
 Allan, above n 2 CLJ at 694; Edwards, above n 2 at 866; Kavanagh, above n 2 Constitutional Review p 242; 
Hunt, above n 2, p 340. See also D Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal 
Culture’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 11; HC debs, 21 October 1998, vol 317, col 1357; C 
O’ Cinneide, Human rights and the UK constitution (The British Academy, 2012) pp 16, 24. 
29
 Eg Roth at [27]; Naik at [46]-[48], [64]; Belmarsh at [42]-[44]; Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: a tangled story’ 
[2005] PL 346; Jowell, above n 2.  
30
 The Lord Chancellor explained that the Bill was designed to give courts ‘as much space as possible to protect 
human rights’: HL Debs, 3 November 1997, vol 582, col 1227. 
31
 Jowell, above n 2, p 70; T Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p 23. 
32
 Feldman, above n 7, pp 122-124. 
33
 Craig, above n 1, p 629. See also Jowell, above n 2, p 79.  
34
 A Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), pp 443-446. 
35
 For accounts of why courts are suited to guarding rights, see eg J Raz, ‘Disagreement in Politics’ 43 Am J 
Juris 25 (1998); D Feldman, ‘Human Rights, terrorism and risk: the roles of politicians and judges’ [2006] PL 
364. Cf J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
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To fulfil these three expectations, a minimum intensity of review comprising three 
corresponding characteristics must be observed.  
 
(a) Full proportionality analysis 
 
To realise the first expectation that a rigorous and structured proportionality analysis would 
be applied to protect human rights, courts must at least determine whether a rights-limiting 
measure passes the 4-stage proportionality enquiry explained in section 2, including the 3
rd
 
and 4
th
 stages on whether the measure is no more than necessary and overall proportionate.
36
 
The first two stages of the proportionality enquiry on legitimate aim and rationality are 
threshold questions that are implicit in traditional standards of review. The 3
rd
 and 4
th
 stages 
are the crunch questions that guarantee the extra scrutiny in human rights review. Traditional 
standards were rejected in the rights context precisely because they are unable to offer such 
extra protective force.  In adjusting the rigour of proportionality analysis to suit the context, 
courts should bear in mind that at the dawn of the HRA, they have already rejected lower 
standards of review and placed rights on the highest section of the spectrum of judicial 
interference. It would be a ‘striking irony’ to re-open lower zones of the spectrum in 
implementing Parliament-ordained rights, just as the ordinary common law has sealed off 
these zones to safeguard fundamental rights.
37
  
Judges have generally recognised that proportionality review should be searching and 
structured in rights cases, but many fail to see that they themselves have flouted this 
expectation by blunting the proportionality test in the following ways, sometimes as a result 
of blindly importing Strasbourg’s margin of appreciation:38 
(1) By-passing one or more stages of the proportionality enquiry, often the 3rd and 4th 
stages.
39
 
                                                 
36
 This position is supported by some commentators. See eg Fordham and de la Mare, above n 7. Hickman 
cautions that if we do not give structure and content to proportionality, then the expectations of proportionality 
being ‘intrusive, precise and sophisticated’ would be defied. T Hickman, ‘The substance and structure of 
proportionality’ [2008] PL 694, at 716. 
37
 Cf Allan’s criticism of ‘due deference’, above n 2 CLJ 672. 
38
 A recent example is S and KF. 
39
 Wilson, per Lord Hobhouse; Shayler at [80]-[85], [99]-[118], arguably skipped third and fourth stages; 
Samaroo at [19]-[20], skipped 3
rd
 stage; Farrakhan, skipped all stages; Marper v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire [2003] 1 All ER 148 at [42], assumed answer to 3
rd
 stage. 
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(2) Merging all four stages of the enquiry into one general question of whether the 
government has struck a fair balance or whether the measure is reasonable or 
permissible.
40
 
(3) Intervening only when the measure is manifestly disproportionate.41 
(4) Asking whether the measure can reasonably be considered as proportionate.42 
(5) Diluting the ‘no more than necessary’ question to whether the means is reasonably 
necessary to achieve the aim.
43
 
 
If one were to remain faithful to the rigour and structure expected of proportionality review in 
rights cases, these forms of deference must be rejected. 
The structured character of proportionality is much attenuated through (2), which 
resembles the single unstructured test of reasonableness asked in the pre-HRA era.
44
 (2)-(4) 
amount to applying a standard of review lower than and different from proportionality. (2) is 
reminiscent of the intuitive test of Wednesbury. The House of Lords’ judgment in ProLife can 
be interpreted as exhibiting (2). The majority remarked that the court could not interfere with 
the BBC’s decision to ban the litigant’s election broadcast unless it was unreasonable and 
should not carry out the balancing exercise between rights.
45
 Some academics seem to have 
endorsed such light-touch review. When explaining that the intensity of review should vary 
with the seriousness of the rights limitation, Rivers argues that the relaxed form of judicial 
scrutiny in ProLife would be ‘appropriate’ for ‘relatively minor’ violations of rights but not 
for the ProLife case itself, which involves a serious inroad into the important right to political 
free speech.
46
 However, even less severe violations of something as important as human 
rights do not justify reintroducing the form of non-penetrating and unstructured review found 
in ProLife. While Rivers’ idea of varying the intensity according to the severity of rights 
interference is helpful (as will be discussed in section 4(b)), his theory is ultimately deficient 
due to the lack of a baseline intensity that guarantees effective protection of individual rights. 
                                                 
40
 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] HRLR 45 (SIAC), p 1290; ProLife; Belfast City 
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Knafaim. 
41
 See above n 4. 
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 ProLife at [8], [16], [51], [58], [73], [77]. 
46
 Rivers, above n 2, at 206. 
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Regarding (3), just as unreasonableness and Wednesbury unreasonableness are in truth 
different standards of review, disproportionality and manifest disproportionality are really 
different standards. As section 2 shows, post-HRA, it is expected that an interference with 
rights is only allowed if it is not disproportionate. The test is for disproportionality rather than 
manifest disproportionality. Given the importance of human rights, which the reception of 
proportionality in rights cases seeks to recognise, there is no normative reason why a measure 
that encroaches rights can be sustained if it is not manifestly disproportionate, though 
disproportionate.
47
 
As regards (4), testing for whether a measure can reasonably be considered as 
proportionate is very different from asking whether it is proportionate.
48
 Regarding the 
former, the court need only enquire whether a reasonable person can consider it as 
proportionate. Yet for the latter, the court must itself answer the substantive question. Recent 
judgments have rightly rejected (4) as being redolent of the traditional reasonableness test 
and insufficient for protecting rights.
49
 
(1) and (5) lower the rigour of review to a standard far below that expected of 
proportionality in rights cases. The ‘no more than necessary’ test ensures that rights are 
infringed to the smallest extent possible. If this question is watered down to one of reasonable 
necessity, a rights-limiting measure may be adopted even when there is a less intrusive 
measure.
50
 The overall proportionality test ensures that the benefits of a measure are overall 
worth the costs to a democratic society. If both the ‘no more than necessary’ and overall 
proportionality tests are omitted, then we would be left with the first two threshold questions 
on legitimate aim and rationality, which exemplify a ‘purified idea of Wednesbury’.51 If 
either or both of the ‘no more than necessary’ and overall proportionality tests are 
abbreviated, much of the protective force expected of rights review will be lost. Kavanagh 
and other supporters of ‘due deference’ argue that courts should give varying degrees of 
weight to the government’s views.52 Kavanagh in particular supports exhibiting such 
deference through the reasonable proportionality and fair balance formulae.
53
 While the idea 
of giving weight to the government’s views is useful (as will be discussed in section 4(c)), 
                                                 
47
 Cf Elliott, above n 18, p 283. 
48
 Cf the distinction between standard of legality and standard of review drawn in Hickman, above n 31, p 99. 
49
 Eg Daly; Huang. 
50
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Elliott, above n 18, pp 270-280. 
51
 Rivers, above n 2 at 198. 
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 Kavanagh, Young, Hunt, above n 2. 
53
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these formulae for exhibiting deference reduce the rigour of scrutiny to a level below that 
appropriate for rights cases.  
One may object that the different formulations in the HRA of the level of necessity 
required for curtailing rights should be reflected in different designs of the proportionality 
test. The ‘no more than necessary’ and ‘overall balance’ tests should only be applied to test 
interferences with highly important rights like the right to life, which, according to the HRA, 
may only be curtailed when ‘absolutely necessary’ (article 2). More relaxed proportionality 
tests in the form of (1)-(5) should apply to less important rights such as the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions, which may be restricted when ‘in the public interest’ (article 1 of 
protocol 1). 
My reply is as follows. I do not dispute that the HRA contains a hierarchy of rights. 
However, as discussed, judges and scholars unequivocally accept that rights categorically 
attract the most stringent examination. In pronouncing this stance, courts and academics 
made no distinction between different rights in the HRA.
54
 In contrast, they stressed that the 
Convention is not an exhaustive statement of rights;
55
 all the rights therein are fundamental 
and deserve to be guarded zealously, even if some deserve to be guarded more jealously than 
others. One must not forget that even the right to property has traditionally been considered a 
fundamental right.
56
 It is undisputed that the different levels of importance of rights listed in 
the HRA should be reflected in different intensities of review, but each review should comply 
with a baseline intensity that can ensure that all of these rights are adequately protected. Post-
Daly, it is recognised that an exact and structured proportionality review forms part of this 
baseline. This view is in line with the text of the HRA. As Greer argues, even property rights 
should be given procedural priority over other interests, because the wording of article 1 of 
protocol 1 insists that deprivations are not allowed unless proven to be in the public interest. 
Greer rightly maintains that even in relation to interferences with this right, the government 
must demonstrate that alternatives have been properly considered and the interference is 
                                                 
54
 Although Lord Steyn ended his judgment in Daly with the remark that the intensity of review would depend 
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proportionate.
57
 To realise expectations of intense proportionality review in rights cases, 
courts should interpret the diverse textual formulations of the necessity test as calling for 
varying intensities of review beyond a minimum threshold intensity. 
 
(b) Government discharging burden with sufficient and cogent reasons 
 
The other two components of the baseline intensity concern the standard of proof that the 
government must meet in demonstrating the proportionality of a rights-limiting measure and 
how the government should meet its standard of proof. Let us examine the latter first. The 
HRA is silent on this issue, but if the second constitutional expectation of the HRA fostering 
a culture of justification is to be fulfilled, courts must observe a second requirement in the 
baseline intensity: demanding the government to demonstrate the proportionality of a rights 
limitation with sufficient and cogent reasons.
58
  
It would be useful at this point to expound the distinction between first- and second- 
order reasons,
59
 which I have elsewhere explored in detail.
60
 First-order reasons are those that 
relate to the merits of the particular case in question, based on which the court makes its own 
determination of rights. Second-order reasons are concerns of institutional capacity or 
democratic legitimacy, which do not affect the court’s own substantive determination of the 
merits but which act as ‘reweighting’ reasons.61 If a court defers to the government on 
second-order grounds, it will be treating the government’s case as stronger than what the 
court, on its own balance of first-order reasons, considers it to be.
62
 
Both first- and second- order reasons, if properly established, can qualify as cogent 
reasons for supporting the government’s case. It is self-explanatory why this is so in relation 
to first-order reasons. Why second-order reasons can count as cogent reasons is more 
controversial and will be justified in section 4(c). For the moment, I will explain why second-
                                                 
57
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order claims of institutional competence and legitimacy do not qualify as cogent reasons if 
they are not backed by evidence. The government proves its case solely with first-order 
reasons of institutional competence when it can adduce reasons and evidence to persuade the 
court on the merits that it is correct.
63
 It relies on second-order reasons of superior 
intelligence-gathering ability when it claims that there is useful information to support its 
case but it cannot reveal such information to the court.
64
 It relies on second-order claims of 
superior expertise when it claims that it has general expertise in deciding this kind of issue 
(eg national security questions) but is unable to persuade the court on the merits of the 
particular case in question.
65
 These second-order claims can only be validly established if the 
government body can adduce evidence, such as its institutional features, qualifications and 
past performance, to persuade the court that it indeed possesses the said general expertise or 
useful intelligence.
66
 Likewise, a second-order claim of superior democratic legitimacy in 
making a certain decision can only be established if the government can produce evidence, 
such as the degree of public participation in the decision-making process, to show that the 
decision was indeed democratically made.
67
 If a court grants second-order claims without 
probing their evidential basis, it would be granting mere assertions or presumptions about the 
government’s superior institutional competence – neither of which can count as cogent 
second-order reasons.  
It is undisputed that the government must prove its claims with sufficient and cogent 
evidence.
68
 Courts have made references to the government having to proffer ‘substantial’ 
‘objective’ justification,69 ‘cogent’70, ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ evidence.71 Yet some judges 
fail to see that they breached this standard when they deferred in the following ways: 
(i) Granting claims of proportionality when there is no or insufficient evidence to support 
them.
72
 
                                                 
63
 Examples of the government being able to persuade the court using first-order reasons include: Re E (a child) 
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65
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33-35.  
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 Eg Mahmood at [39]-[40]; Samaroo at [30]-[32];  
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 Eg Ghaidan at [19]. 
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(ii) Adding weight to the government’s case on the basis of mere assertions or 
presumptions about superior institutional capacity or legitimacy i.e. granting untested 
second-order claims of superior competence.
73
 
 
(i) relates to the sufficiency of evidence, whereas (ii) relates to cogency.
74
 An example of (i) 
is found in the High Court’s approach in Quila,75 where the government argued that 
increasing the minimum age requisite for the grant of a marriage visa to 21 was proportionate 
to the prevention of forced marriages. The court ruled that the measure was proportionate, 
mainly because it granted the government’s judgment that the problem of forced marriage 
was a pernicious one. The court’s evaluation of the nexus between the measure and the aim 
and whether the measure was narrowly tailored was most cursory. As the appeal judgments 
demonstrate, abundant evidence suggested that the measure was irrational and over-
inclusive.
76
 
(ii) is typically displayed in cases where the government asserts that it has useful 
intelligence that cannot be revealed to the court, i.e. it relies on second-order grounds of 
superior intelligence-gathering abilities. The Court of Appeal in Farrakhan
77
 and Lord Scott 
in Gillan
78
 exhibited this type of deference when they accepted the government’s assertions 
of useful secret intelligence without probing the reliability of the intelligence-gathering body 
and the need to conceal evidence. In these cases, the courts gave extra weight to the 
government’s views because of mere assertions of useful information. 
Another example of (ii) is where the court grants second-order claims of expertise or 
legitimacy without testing their evidential basis. In Belmarsh, when deciding whether there 
was an emergency threatening the life of the nation, the majority of the House of Lords 
granted the government’s case although they had ‘great doubt’ on the merits, partly because 
they presumed that the latter possessed general expertise in making national security 
judgments. The court did not explain why they were confident that such expertise existed 
despite ‘widespread scepticism… [over] intelligence assessments since the fiasco over Iraqi 
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weapons’.79 Likewise, in Animal Defenders, Lord Bingham attached significant weight to the 
government’s view that the statutory ban on political advertising was a proportionate 
interference with political freedom of expression, because he presumed the ability and 
legitimacy of Parliament in striking the balance: ‘it is reasonable to expect that our 
democratically-elected politicians will be peculiarly sensitive to the measures necessary to 
safeguard the integrity of our democracy. It cannot be supposed that… judges, will be more 
so.’80 
In the above-mentioned cases, courts granted measures that interfered with important 
rights such as rights to free speech, marry, private life, or non-discrimination, or derogations 
from the obligation to safeguard the right to liberty, when there is insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the justifiability of the measures, or on the basis of untested assertions or 
presumptions. Granting the government’s claims in this manner amounts to exercising a leap 
of faith – lightening or reversing the government’s burden of proof.81 Rivers was therefore 
calling for judicial abdication when he envisaged that it would be legitimate for courts in 
cases of minor violations of rights to ‘simply accept the assertion’ of the government, or be 
‘very unwilling to question [its] view’.82 In a similar vein, despite Kavanagh’s emphasis that 
we should not presume courts to be institutionally inferior,
83
 her asking courts to defer 
whenever they are in doubt and endorsing the court’s approach to deference in Gillan, 
Farrakhan and Belmarsh
84
 effectively invite courts to presume that the government is 
institutionally more competent whenever the courts are uncertain. These attitudes upset the 
justificatory burden and culture in the HRA era. 
 
(c) Proving proportionality on a balance of probabilities 
 
The third requirement of the baseline intensity concerns the standard of proof that the 
government must meet in proving that a prima facie limitation of rights is proportionate. 
                                                 
79
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Courts have resisted applying the concept of the standard of proof in assessing whether the 
government has discharged its onus of justifying a rights limitation.
85
 In their view, the 
concept only applies to proof of facts, not to justification of judgments on evaluative 
questions such as whether a measure is proportionate. 
I acknowledge that the kind of evidence required to prove a fact may differ from that 
required to prove the soundness of a judgment. Yet the idea of the court being certain of a 
proposition to a requisite degree is applicable to evaluative as much as it is to factual 
questions. In fact, UK courts have applied the concept of the standard of proof to questions of 
evaluation.
86
 Canadian courts have established that the government must prove to the civil 
standard that a prima facie interference with rights is proportionate.
87
 In the U.S., courts 
apply a standard of proof intermediary to the civil and criminal standards, known as ‘clear 
and convincing evidence’, to test whether an interference with constitutional rights is 
justified.
88
 Although UK courts have not expressly adopted the terminology of standard of 
proof in HRA cases, their references to claims of proportionality having to be ‘convincingly 
established’89 or ‘persuasive’,90 or having been ‘on balance’91 established, indicate that a 
similar concept is at work. 
I suggest that the third component of the baseline requires the court to be satisfied on a 
balance of probabilities that a rights-infringing measure is proportionate before sanctioning it. 
If the arguments for and against proportionality are equally strong or the court is uncertain 
which side is stronger, then the burden of proof, which signifies the importance of rights in 
the case of a tie or uncertainty, demands the court to rule against the government. 
If courts are to fulfil the third constitutional expectation of them acting as guardians of 
rights, they must at least be satisfied that a rights-limiting measure is on balance 
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proportionate before permitting it. The standard of proof reflects the comparative social costs 
of erroneous rulings. It is designed to minimize errors regarding interests that we consider 
vital.
92
 Where a party has at stake ‘an interest of transcending value – as a criminal defendant 
his liberty – this margin of error is reduced as to him by… placing on the other party [a 
higher standard of proof].’93 In a typical case brought under the HRA, once a prima facie 
interference with rights has been established, two considerations are pitted against each other: 
an unjustified interference with an individual right versus a potential harm to public interest. 
Given the importance of human rights and the certainty of the limitation, the former 
consideration ought to attract some threshold weight. Courts as guardians of rights should 
consider the consequences of the former at least as grave as that of the latter, hence my 
suggestion of the balance of probabilities as the bottomline standard of proof. I cannot see 
how courts can claim to protect rights if they do not even need to be persuaded on balance 
that an interference is justified. 
Greer suggests that UK courts should adopt the U.S.’ intermediate standard when rights 
in articles 8-11 of the Convention are involved because these rights are important.
94
 This may 
be justified and I reserve my arguments on this. In section 4(b) I will argue that the standard 
of proof may increase when graver rights violations are engaged. Nonetheless, in formulating 
a baseline intensity I have in mind the scenario of a minor interference with a less important 
right set in opposition to the likely satisfaction of an important public interest, where the civil 
standard seems most appropriate. An example would be the regulation of strategies of 
tobacco retailing, which arguably sets a modest interference with tobacco companies’ 
monetary interests up against a substantial increase in public health. The property right 
involved, though relatively less important than some rights, is still an important value and 
deserves some threshold weight to be protected by the civil standard, though a higher 
standard may overstate the relative cost of a mistaken ruling against the litigant. 
Unlike deviations from the first two requirements of the baseline, UK courts’ departures 
from this requirement have been less overt. Courts have never expressly said that they had 
granted the government’s claim of proportionality despite not being persuaded on balance 
that it is established. Yet there have been instances where courts hinted that they had granted 
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the government’s case notwithstanding grave doubts.95 Also, writers such as Kavanagh, in 
asking courts to defer when the merits are balanced, are effectively advocating that the 
government need not prove its case on a balance of probabilities.
96
 It is therefore important to 
remind courts that to live up to their role as protectors of rights, they cannot grant limitations 
of rights unless they are on balance persuaded that such restrictions are proportionate. 
 
4. THE VARIABILITY OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
So far I have argued that the constitutional framework of the HRA demands courts to apply 
proportionality with a minimum degree of rigour. It may be objected that compliance with 
this threshold across all human rights cases cannot accommodate courts’ varying levels of 
institutional capacity and legitimacy in diverse cases involving different issues and degrees of 
limitation of rights, as well as differences in the importance and nature of rights. This section 
will explicate why adherence to the proposed baseline can remain fully sensitive to variations 
in the adjudicative context. 
 
(a) Variability in the substantive theory of proportionality 
 
First, the substantive theory of proportionality itself, which states that the more serious the 
violation of rights, the weightier must the countervailing consideration be, has already partly 
accommodated differences in contextual factors like the importance and nature of the right 
and the degree of interference.
97
 An interest that qualifies as a legitimate aim in relation to 
one right may not so qualify with regards to a more important right.
98
 A measure that is least 
intrusive of a right and overall proportionate may not be so if a more serious limitation of the 
right is involved. There is thus an in-built sensitivity to the adjudicative context within the 
substantive theory of proportionality. 
 
(b) Variable intensity of review beyond baseline 
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Secondly, adjusting the intensity of review beyond the baseline offers additional sensitivity to 
context. My proposed formal theory of proportionality consists of an invariable baseline 
intensity as well as a formula for varying the intensity above this threshold. 
As guardians of rights, courts should vary the intensity of review in accordance with the 
seriousness of the rights limitation. This highly intuitive position can be explained by 
considering the rationale behind the standard of proof discussed earlier on. The more serious 
the encroachment of the right, the graver the consequences for the litigant, and the more the 
fundamental values of our society are at stake, thus the higher the social cost of a mistaken 
ruling against the litigant. Courts should weigh this cost against the possible cost of an 
erroneous ruling against the government. If the former outweighs the latter, then a higher than 
civil standard of proof should apply. As protectors of rights, courts ought to be particularly 
concerned to see that the former is not lightly sanctioned. The seriousness of the rights 
violation should therefore be the prime concern guiding the court’s determination of the 
standard of proof above the baseline threshold. It is impossible to enumerate all the specific 
circumstances that will attract a higher than baseline standard of proof. Suffice it to say that 
courts should vary such standard mainly according to the severity of the limitation of rights. 
This conclusion is not novel. Rivers similarly concludes that since courts as guardians of 
rights, they should vary the intensity of review according to the severity of the rights 
limitation: ‘the more serious a limitation of right is, the more evidence the court will require 
that the factual basis of the limitation has been correctly established’99 and the more ‘the 
court will demand that the authority puts procedural resources into answering the relevant 
questions reliably’.100 However, he arrived at this conclusion via a different line of reasoning 
– one which is unsatisfactory. His logic resembles a ‘prior probability’ approach: 
 
If there is only a minor limitation of rights, all that is needed to justify it is a minor gain, 
or the chance of a major gain. Either of these is inherently probable, so the court need 
not be excessively sceptical about claims that they are present. However, as the 
seriousness of the limitation of rights increases, so that the inherent probability of 
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sufficient outweighing gains decreases, and so the decision-taker has to work harder to 
persuade the court…101 
 
It is unclear why a minor gain in public interest is inherently probable while a major gain is 
inherently not.
102
 For Rivers’ reasoning to stand, we at least need more information on the 
prevalence of minor and major gains in public interests. Common sense tells us that how 
probable a gain in public interest is depends on many factors including the kind of interest 
concerned, and that there is no necessary correlation between the extent of gain and the 
probability of attaining the gain. Some major gains in public interest are frequently achieved 
(e.g. improving public hygiene), while some minor gains therein may be rare (e.g. making the 
country safer from nuclear attacks). As it stands, Rivers’ reasoning is insufficient to ground 
his conclusion of varying the rigour of review in accordance with the seriousness of the rights 
violation. The above analysis relying on the rationale behind the standard of proof provides 
an alternative explanation of this intuitive conclusion.
103
 
 
(c) Variable nature of evidence 
 
Supporters of due deference may object that my prescription for varying the intensity of 
review does not adequately accommodate the government’s superior institutional capacity 
and legitimacy to decide particular issues.
104
 According to my theory so far, it is the 
seriousness of the rights interference rather than the capacity and legitimacy of the court vis-
à-vis the government body in deciding a particular issue that directly controls the rigour of 
scrutiny on that issue. The objection goes, that these considerations do not necessarily map 
onto each other. The court may lack the relative expertise or legitimacy to decide an issue in a 
case that involves a grave violation of rights. A theory that calls for searching review in such 
a case is insensitive to the limits of judicial function and capacity. 
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This objection is ultimately invalid, but it is an important one as it exposes that Rivers’ 
formula for varying the intensity of review, standing alone, cannot satisfactorily quench the 
principal concern that triggers deference: courts may lack the ability or legitimacy to decide 
specific issues in a case. I wish to supplement Rivers’ theory by highlighting a third element 
of variability in the doctrine of proportionality: the nature of the evidence (i.e. first- or 
second- order) that can demonstrate the proportionality of a measure is variable; the 
government may prove the proportionality of a rights limitation through adducing first- or 
second- order reasons, or a combination of both kinds of reasons. Courts can take into 
account the government’s superior institutional competence and democratic credentials in 
deciding particular issues, without having to relax the intensity of review nor compromise the 
baseline intensity of review, by adding appropriate weight to the government’s case on the 
basis of second-order reasons that are established by evidence.  
Let us first examine how courts can accommodate the government’s superior 
institutional competence. This issue comes into play when the court faces epistemic 
uncertainty and is most relevant in the 3
rd
 stage of the proportionality test, which involves a 
factual inquiry of whether a measure is least restrictive of a right. If the government can 
demonstrate its superior institutional competence by producing cogent first-order reasons to 
show that the measure is the least restrictive means,
105
 then so be it. Where the government is 
unable to do so, owing to, say, its inability to reveal intelligence information, but claims that 
it deserves deference because it possesses superior intelligence-gathering abilities (i.e. relying 
on second-order reasons of institutional competence), then the court apparently suffers from 
an information deficit.
106
 According to my suggested baseline of review, before the court may 
trust that the alleged useful intelligence exists, it should probe whether the government 
indeed possesses reliable intelligence-gathering capacity that warrants deference. The court 
can examine the institutional features and past performance of the intelligence agencies to see 
if they are likely to honestly and reliably return useful intelligence this time.
107
  If the court is 
satisfied that the government’s claim of useful secret intelligence is well-founded, then the 
court may, on the basis of such established second-order reason, add weight to the 
government’s case of the measure being least intrusive.108 The amount of weight to be added 
should depend on how reliable the claim of institutional competence is. In short, the 
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government may discharge its onus by presenting first- and/or second- order reasons. What 
matters is that these reasons must be cogent and not based on mere suppositions or assertions, 
and that they must overall be sufficient to show that the measure is on balance no more than 
necessary.  
The question of relative democratic legitimacy comes into play when value judgments 
have to be made and is most relevant in the 4
th
 stage of the proportionality analysis, which 
asks whether the benefits of the measure outweigh the costs. The government may be able to 
convince the court that the gains outweigh the costs to a democratic society using first-order 
logic alone, say, by explaining what the qualities of a democratic society are and why the 
measure enhances the most important of these qualities to a large extent while harming less 
important qualities to a smaller extent. If the government can do so, then so be it. However, 
the government may be unable to do so, and may simply insist that courts should respect the 
former’s view of how the balance should be struck because it is a view that is arrived at 
through a procedure that is more democratic than the judicial process (i.e. the government 
relies on second-order reasons of democratic legitimacy). When this happens, I propose that 
before the court may add weight to the government’s case by virtue of such second-order 
reasons, the court should scrutinise the decision-making procedure to see if a balance had 
indeed been struck and to assess the extent to which the decision-making body was 
democratically returned and the decision-making process had incorporated public 
participation.
109
 If the court is satisfied that the decision indeed bears the stamp of democratic 
approval, this established second-order reason of legitimacy can add weight to the 
government’s case of proportionality.110 The degree of weight to be added should depend on 
how democratic the decision-making process is. What ultimately matters is the court must be 
satisfied on cogent reasons that the gains outweigh the losses. 
This proposal of asking courts to accommodate the government’s superior competence 
by taking into account second-order reasons is similar to the suggestions of due deference 
supporters, who argue that courts should give appropriate weight to second-order reasons.
111
 
However, my proposal differs from or supplements their theories in one crucial respect: 
second-order reasons themselves need to be established by cogent evidence. This point was 
not fully addressed in,
112
 was omitted in,
113
 or, as demonstrated in section 3(b), is inconsistent 
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with,
114
 their theories. Nonetheless, this simple point would be indispensable for any theory 
of deference to be compatible with the ethos of justification under the HRA. 
I acknowledge that it is not entirely uncontroversial to claim that judicial consideration 
of second-order reasons complies with constitutional principles under the HRA. The keenest 
opponent to due deference – Trevor Allan – insists that adjudication should proceed on the 
basis of first-order reasons alone. If a court gives weight to second-order reasons, it would 
abdicate its duty to enforce its ‘own best judgment of a party’s legal rights’.115 Denying a 
claimant its rights merely ‘in virtue of his comparative ignorance or lack of special 
qualifications’ goes against ‘adjudication as an institutional expression of the influence of 
reasoned argument’.116 Judicial impartiality is breached, because allowing the government to 
rely on considerations that are extraneous to the case gives the government an unfair 
advantage.
117
 The culture of justification is impaired as the government is not required to 
prove its case with reasons specifically applicable to the case.
118
 On the other hand, Jowell 
does not oppose deference on grounds of institutional capacity but rejects that on grounds of 
democratic legitimacy.
119
 The argument goes, that the HRA has given the independent 
judiciary a constitutional mandate to guard rights against majoritarian intrusion. If courts pass 
the buck back to the majority by deferring to the democratic will when adjudicating rights, 
they would abdicate their duty to protect rights. 
I am aware that my brief reply below is insufficient to do justice to the sophisticated 
arguments of these authors, but space prevents a fuller reply, which I have proffered 
elsewhere.
120
 Here I will put forward the gist of my case on why my proposal of giving 
weight to second-order reasons established by evidence is consistent with post-HRA 
constitutional principles. Let us look at institutional competence first. Rationality requires 
courts to give weight to the views of a body that is more likely to be correct. Courts defer to 
expert opinion all the time. In adjudicating claims of rights, second-order reasons of superior 
expertise or intelligence-gathering abilities, if established, tell the court whether the 
government is more likely to be correct, and thus assist the court in making, rather than 
compel it to set aside, its ‘own best judgment’. The reasoned nature of adjudication and the 
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culture of justification are not compromised, because second-order reasons themselves need 
to be established by cogent evidence. The court does not give the government a special 
advantage by allowing it to rely on second-order reasons, since the government bears the 
burden of establishing these reasons. Under these arrangements, the court’s scrutiny remains 
as intense; the government’s task of proving the justifiability of a measure remains as 
onerous. 
Turning now to the giving of weight to democratic legitimacy. When deciding whether 
an interference with rights is justified in a democratic society, courts need to make a value 
judgment of what a democratic society requires. It is true that the role of courts as guardians 
of rights requires them to ultimately make this judgment themselves. Yet in doing so courts 
must bear in mind that Britain itself is a democratic society and the values of its people would 
be relevant to this judgment, just as the values of other modern democracies would be. Under 
my proposal, the court does not relinquish its role to protect individual rights by giving 
appropriate weight to the value judgments reflected in democratically made decisions, 
because these judgments form only one part of, and are not dispositive of, the normative 
enquiry. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The HRA has altered the constitutional game. To fulfil the new rules, there must be a limit to 
the elasticity of proportionality. Courts should observe a minimum intensity of review that 
requires the government to demonstrate to the court by cogent and sufficient reasons that a 
rights limitation on balance satisfies the distinct stages of the proportionality enquiry. At the 
same time, proportionality review should remain sensitive to the court’s varying levels of 
institutional competence and legitimacy in different adjudicative contexts. Courts can 
preserve this sensitivity by modifying the intensity of review beyond the suggested minimum 
level of review and accepting second-order reasons of superior institutional and constitutional 
competence that are established by evidence.  
A commentator once warned, ‘We are at a crossroads, proportionality can either become 
[a] fig leaf… [or] a powerful normative and predictive tool in public law.’121 Indeed, 
proportionality can replicate traditional review in all but in name or it can become the 
definitive tool for protecting individual rights. Courts have gone some way down the former 
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path. It is hoped that my proposals have provided some steer for a u-turn, restoring vigilant 
judicial oversight of our basic rights and freedoms. 
